Topics for end sem exam 1

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<ol><li> 1. 1 Syllabusof END SEM EXAM: MetaphysicsPortions 1. Personal identity: I. Distinctionof 3 questionsof personalidentity: (Study material File (doc) name: Personal identity : an entry form Stanford Encyclopedia) I.A. Personhood: What is it to be a person? What is necessary, and what suffices, for something to count as a person, as opposed to a non-person? Is it a difference of kind or difference in degree? I.B. Evidential criterion of Personal identity: How do we find out who is who? What evidence bears on the question of whether the person here now is the one who was here yesterday? I.C. Persistence (Constitutive criterion of personal identity) : What does it take for a person to persist from one time to anotherthat is, for the same person to exist at different times? The question is about the numerical identity, not the qualitative identity: that is what make you think that your past counterpart and you are one and the same. II. Different theories of Persistence (Constitutive criterion of personal identity) : (Study material File (PDF) name: personal identity Noonan 1, Introduction of the book by Harold Noonan) Physical criterion Memory criterion, Objections: false memory and identity is transitive memory, while memory is not. Brain criterion and its challenges Ethical implications of the question of personal identity. How notions of responsibility and punishment are related to the questions of personal Identity. 2. Freewill ( the materials and ppts provided by the Tutor) 3. Universals and particulars (Materials: universals and particulars PP. 67- 69) What universals means? </li><li> 2. 2 Can we reduce universals or abstract entities as mental entities? Reduction of universals into particulars Resemblance theory: Only resemblance, No universals. (Materials: universals and particulars PP. 77- 79) Criticism: Resemblance is always a resemblance in a certain respect. resemblance itself is a universals. Universals, Collection and Class (. (Materials: universals and particulars PP. 69- 71) Can we reduce universals into collection of objects. Notion of class and universals: how distinct they are. Distinction between Logical Notion of class (sets) and notion of collection Transitivity relation in both collection and class Relation of collection and its parts and Relation of member and class: are they distinct relations? Reduction of particulars into universals ((Materials: universals and particulars PP. 72-75) Universal refers to predicate. Particulars refers to names Whether particulars can be reduced to universals? (are particulars complex of universal) Reformulation of the question in language / semantic analysis is: whether names can be reduced to descriptions: Whether meaning can be determined by references. Do we have names without references (greatest number)? Do we have reference in the case of fictional entities? Whether such phrases which works as names as really names or descriptions? That is particulars can be reduced to complex of universals? Russells answer is yes. All what we have is descriptions. Therefore, all what we exist is universals. Objections to Russell: </li><li> 3. 3 1. That makes all contingent statement (Aristotle is a philosopher) to analytic statements as the name Aristotle itself is a description. 2. It is logically y possible to have same set of complex qualities, yet they are different concrete particulars. 3. Russell replied by reduced space and time to universals. 4. Problems of the Russells reply. 4. Mind- body Problem I. What is mind- body problem? (( Elements of analytic philosophy mind- body problem pp: 263, ) Mental properties might be causally reducible but are they ontologically reducible to physical properties or entities? Does the description of mental properties demand a non physical language? What are the referents of non- physical terms? How can we explain the intuitive notion of mind body interaction? Is it physical causal relation? Do we have conception of causality other than physical causality? II. Distinction between mental / physical A. Semantic distinction: ( Elements of analytic philosophy mind- body problem p: 264) B. Epistemic distinction: ( Materials: philosophy of mind by Kim: pp: 15-19) and (materials: Thought experiment of colour scientist C. Metaphysical distinction: ( Materials: philosophy of mind by Kim: pp: 19- 20) All physical properties or entities occupy space? Are mental entities or events like dreams spatial? Ontologically Dependent upon an owner/ ontological independence of physical entities: Accessible only to an owner/ public (Materials: Elements of analytic philosophy mind- body problem pp: 267- 269) </li><li> 4. 4 III. Cartesian dualism(substance dualism); (materials: PDF file Descartes arguments) A. Permanence of soul: ( Materials: Elements of analytic philosophy mind- body problem pp: 264- 265) IV. Leibinzs psycho- physical parallelism. ( Elements of analytic philosophy mind- body problem pp: 275- 276) V. Behaviourism: (material: philosophy of mind by Kim: pp: 25-33) Semantic equivalence: Meaning of statements concerned of behaviours and meaning statement of mental entities are equivalence. Verbal behaviours VI. Psycho neural identity theory(materials: philosophy of mind by Kim: pp: 47- 52, 68-75) Explanation in physical terms and description in physical terms Do we have psycho neural laws to derive (explain) metal properties Various possibilities of explain correlation. Criticisms: Possibilities of Zombies and Soul: why possibilities are so significant ( Materials: word file on Zombies) Modal argument: Contingent identity statements possible? Multiple realization argument and basic notion of functionalism </li></ol>